The modern state of the Pauli exclusion principle studies is discussed. The Pauli exclusion principle can be considered from two viewpoints. On the one hand, it asserts that particles with half-integer spin (fermions) are described by antisymmetric wave functions, and particles with integer spin (bosons) are described by symmetric wave functions. This is a so-called spin-statistics connection. The reasons why the spin-statistics connection exists are still unknown, see discussion in text. On the other hand, according to the Pauli exclusion principle, (...) the permutation symmetry of the total wave functions can be only of two types: symmetric or antisymmetric, all other types of permutation symmetry are forbidden; although the solutions of the Schrödinger equation may belong to any representation of the permutation group, including the multi-dimensional ones. It is demonstrated that the proofs of the Pauli exclusion principle in some textbooks on quantum mechanics are incorrect and, in general, the indistinguishability principle is insensitive to the permutation symmetry of the wave function and cannot be used as a criterion for the verification of the Pauli exclusion principle. Heuristic arguments are given in favor that the existence in nature only the one-dimensional permutation representations (symmetric and antisymmetric) are not accidental. As follows from the analysis of possible scenarios, the permission of multi-dimensional representations of the permutation group leads to contradictions with the concept of particle identity and their independence. Thus, the prohibition of the degenerate permutation states by the Pauli exclusion principle follows from the general physical assumptions underlying quantum theory. (shrink)

Sahip olduğu akademik imkânların ve başta İngilizce olmak üzere birçok dilde uluslararası yayınların çokluğu nedeniyle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’ndeki İslam çalışmaları yoğun, üretken ve dünya genelinde ilgiyle takip edilen bir alandır. Ancak Batı’daki üniversitelerin genelinde olduğu gibi Amerikan üniversitelerinde de İslam felsefesi/tarihi çalışmaları oldukça zayıftır. Bu makalede öncelikle geçmişten günümüze İslam çalışmalarının ABD’deki durumu tasviri bir metotla ortaya konulmakta ve İslam Felsefesinin ABD’deki İslam çalışmaları içerisindeki zayıf konumu sorgulanmaktadır. İkinci olarak Post-Oryantalist süreçte İslam Felsefesi çalışmalarında öne çıkan isimler ve çalışmaları değerlendirilmektedir. (...) Sonuç olarak ABD üniversite sisteminin genel yapısının gereği olarak İslam Felsefesi çalışmaları nicelik bakımından Avrupa ve İslam coğrafyasından daha zayıf olduğu görülmektedir. Bu durumu iki şekilde açıklamak mümkündür. Birincisi alanın Amerikan devlet felsefesinin temel ilkesi olan bilgi-güç hedefi ve alanın politik çıkarlarıyla ilişkisinin zayıflığıdır. Bu durum Post-Oryantalist eğilimin arka planını da oluşturmaktadır. İkincisi ise fenomenolojist yönteme olan ilginin artması ve Amerikan yükseköğretim sisteminde hâkim olan kozmopolitanizm ve interdisiplinerci yaklaşımlardır.Özet: Dünyanın önde gelen üniversitelerinde İslam çalışmaları ve bu çalışmalar içerisinde yer alan İslam felsefesi çalışmalarının önemli bir akademik ilgi alanı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu ilgi ABD’de de yaklaşık 150 yıllık bir geçmişe sahiptir. Son yıllarda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde İslam çalışmalarında sadece ciddi bir artış değil aynı zamanda çeşitlenme de söz konusu olmuştur. ABD’deki İslam çalışmaları ve özelde İslam felsefesi çalışmalarının durumunu birlikte ele alan akademik araştırmalar ise henüz bulunmamaktadır. Son gelişmeleri de dikkate alarak alanla ilgili araştırmaların sürdürülmesi ve İslam felsefesi çalışmalarının da noksan bırakılan izinin sürülmesi gerekmektedir. Bu noktadan hareketle bu makale çalışması, üniversite müfredatlarıyla ilgili araştırmalar, web taramaları ve yazılı materyaller üzerinden gerçekleştirilecek ve ilgili kitaplar, makaleler ve diğer kaynaklar taranarak konu hakkında deskriptif bilgiler sunulacaktır. Bu yöntemin tercih edilme nedeni derinlemesine bir araştırmadan daha çok genel resmi ortaya koymak ve mevcut durum hakkında bilgi vermektir. Sahanın genişliği ve kaynakların çeşitliliği ve konunun daha özel ve yoğun bir çalışma gerektiren yapısı nedeniyle diğer yöntemler tercih edilmemiştir Çalışma iki ana başlıktan oluşmaktadır. Birincisi ABD’deki İslam çalışmalarının konumu ile ilgilidir. Bu başlık altında 18. yüzyıldan itibaren İslam çalışmalarının ABD’deki seyri hakkında bilgi verilmekte ve İslam çalışmalarının günümüzdeki konumu detaylandırılmaktadır. İkinci başlık İslam Felsefesi çalışmalarının İslam çalışmaları içerisindeki ve ABD akademilerindeki konumuyla ilgilidir. Bu başlık altında İslam Felsefesi çalışmalarının geçmişten günümüze kadar gelinen süreçte geçirdiği evreler tasvir edilmekte ve bazı isimlerin ve eserlerinin değerlendirmesi yapılmaktır. İncelemeler sonucunda ABD’deki İslam çalışmalarının geçmişinin yaklaşık 150 yıla tekabül etmesine rağmen yeterli seviyeye ulaşmadığı görüldü. Hâlbuki sahip olduğu Müslüman nüfus, akademik imkânlar ve başta İngilizce olmak üzere birçok dilde uluslararası yayınların çokluğu nedeniyle ABD’deki İslam çalışmalarının beklenenden daha yoğun, üretken olması beklenirdi. Ancak buna rağmen Daha çok Fenomenolojist ve İnterdisipliner yaklaşımın tercih edildiği Amerikan üniversitelerinin akademik kadro çeşitliliği ve başta İngilizce olmak üzere farklı dillerdeki yayın yelpazesinin genişliği ve son yıllarda yeni bir durum olan sosyal medyaya açık akademik faaliyetler ABD’nin İslam çalışmaları alanındaki etkinliğini giderek arttırmaktadır. Geçmişte İslam çalışmalarında öncü rolü oynayan İngiltere, Fransa, Almanya ve Hollanda gibi ülkelerde öteden beri oryantalist eğilimi temsil eden bu tür çalışmalar günümüz ABD üniversitelerinde interdisipliner ve multidisipliner bir format kazarak devam etmektedir. ABD’deki İslam çalışmaları üzerinde yoğunlaşan akademik çalışmalara göre İslam çalışmalarına yön veren en önemli etken oryantalist eğilimlerdir. Bunun yanında 11 Eylül olaylarının sonucunda da artan bir ilgiden söz etmek gerekmektedir. Bu ilgi sadece alanda yeni istihdam imkânlarının oluşmasına değil aynı zamanda araştırmacı sayısının da artmasına neden olmuştur. Çalışmamın ikinci kısmını oluşturan ABD üniversitelerindeki İslam felsefesi çalışmalarının genel durumuna bakılacak olursa bu çalışmaların sosyoloji, antropoloji ve kültür çalışmaları gibi alanlarda görülen çeşitliliğe de sahip olduğunu söylemek oldukça zordur. ABD üniversitelerindeki İslam felsefesi çalışmaları İslam çalışmaları genel çatısı altında sürdürülmektedir. Bu alandaki çalışmalar başlarda daha çok oryantalist eğilimi temsil eden Philip Hittî, Leo Strauss, Muhsin Mehdî, Fazlurrahmân, İsmâil Râci Fârukî, Mâcid Haddûrî, Moshe Pearlmann, gibi önemli isimler tarafından sürdürülmekteydi. Günümüzde Charles Butterworth, Seyyid Hüseyin Nasr, Oliver Leaman, Dimitri Gutas, Robert Wisnovsky, Frank Griffel, John Walbridge ve daha birçok isim yeni eğilimin temsilcileri olarak alanla ilgili çalışmalarını sürdürmektedir. Bu araştırmacılar, Amerikan akademik siteminin bir sonucu olarak sadece İslam felsefesi değil aynı zamanda İslam bilim tarihi, İslam tarihi ve medeniyeti, İslam ve Batı vb. alanlarda da yayınlar yapmakta ve İslam çalışmalarının sürdürüldüğü çeşitli üniversitelerde dersler vermekte ve lisansüstü seviyede öğrenciler yetiştirmektedir. Bu noktadan hareketle diyebiliriz ki İslam felsefesi çalışmaları ise diğer İslam çalışmalarına kıyasla daha da zayıftır. Bu durumun sebeplerini şu şekilde açıklamak mümkündür:1-Amerikan devlet felsefesinin temel ilkesi olan bilgi-güç hedefi ve alanın politik çıkarlarıyla ilişkisinin zayıflığı. Bilimlerle kurulan bu politik çıkar ilişkisi Post-Oryantalist eğilimin arka planını da oluşturmaktadır. 2-Amerikan Üniversitelerinde fenomenolojist yönteme olan ilginin artması ve Amerikan yükseköğretim sisteminde hâkim olan kozmopolitanizm ve interdisiplinerci yaklaşımlar.3-Amerikan üniversitelerindeki Yakın Doğu, Ortadoğu ve İslam Çalışmalarında İslam felsefesi dersleri felsefenin ya da felsefe tarihinin bir parçası olarak müfredatta yer alması. Amerikan üniversitelerinde standart müfredat sistemi yaygın olmadığından İslam felsefesi ile ilgili dersler bölümden daha çok ders veren hocanın ilgisine ve isteğine bağlı olarak verilmektedir.4-Kıta Avrupası’nda görülen katı oryantalist eğilimlerin nisbeten azlığı ve ABD devlet politikalarının gereği olarak şekillenen havuz usulü müfredat.5-Bazı İslam felsefesi uzmanlarının alanı terk ederek daha çok aktüel tartışmalara yönelmesi ve daha çok Müslümanların geri kalmışlığı sorunundan hareketle üretilen problemlere odaklanması. Son olarak İslam felsefesi çalışmaları Müslümanların genelinin ilgilendiği bir disiplin olmadığı için üniversite dışında İslam felsefesi çalışmalarının yürütüldüğü kurumsal yapılar ABD’de de henüz teşekkül etmemiştir. Bazı bölümlerde İslam Felsefesi İslam düşüncesi tarihinin bir alt dalı olarak varlığını sürdürmektedir. Ancak İslam felsefesi müstakil bir alan olarak kendisine henüz ABD üniversitelerinde yer bulamamıştır. USA’da artan İslam çalışmalarının yeterli düzeyde olmasa da dünyadaki islam çalışmalarına yön verebilecek noktaya ulaştığını söylemek mümkündür. (shrink)

Comment by Aaron L. Mackler on “‘Through Her I Too Shall Bear a Child’: Birth Surrogates in Jewish Law” by Elie Spitz Reply by Elie Kaplan Spitz Research Note by G. Scott Davis.

Comment by Aaron L. Mackler on “‘Through Her I Too Shall Bear a Child’: Birth Surrogates in Jewish Law” by Elie Spitz Reply by Elie Kaplan Spitz Research Note by G. Scott Davis.

This paper looks at what David Kaplan's work on indexicals can teach us about logic and the philosophy of logic, and also what Kaplan's logic (i.e. the Logic of Demonstratives) can teach us about indexicals. The lessons are i) that logical consequence is not necessary truth-preservation, ii) that that the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth (also called conventionalism about modality) fails, and iii) that there is a kind of barrier to entailment between non-context-sensitive and context-sensitive claims.

There is a surprising amount of philosophy underlying the way we choose to measure poverty, including in the matter of the seemingly uncomplicated task of specifying an income poverty line. The present essay examines some of these issues of fact, value, and reasoning as they apply to the enterprise of assessing magnitudes of, and trends in, global money-metric poverty.

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain (...) monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift. (shrink)

The central aim of this paper is to shed light on the nature of explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that computational models in this domain possess explanatory force to the extent that they describe the mechanisms responsible for producing a given phenomenon—paralleling how other mechanistic models explain. Conceiving computational explanation as a species of mechanistic explanation affords an important distinction between computational models that play genuine explanatory roles and those that merely provide accurate descriptions or predictions of phenomena. It (...) also serves to clarify the pattern of model refinement and elaboration undertaken by computational neuroscientists. (shrink)

It is illegitimate to read any ontology about "race" off of biological theory or data. Indeed, the technical meaning of "genetic variation" is fluid, and there is no single theoretical agreed-upon criterion for defining and distinguishing populations (or groups or clusters) given a particular set of genetic variation data. Thus, by analyzing three formal senses of "genetic variation"—diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity—we argue that the use of biological theory for making epistemic claims about "race" can only seem plausible when it relies (...) on the user’s own assumptions about race; the move from biological measures to claims about “race” inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification. We also excavate assumptions in the history of the technical discourse over the concept of "race" (e.g., Livingstone's and Dobzhansky's 1962 exchange, Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin 1972, as well as contemporary discussions of cladistic "race", and "races" as clusters). We show that claims about the existence (or non-existence) of "race" are underdetermined by biological facts, methods, and theories. Biological theory does not force the concept of "race" upon us; our social discourse, social ontology, and social expectations do. We become prisoners of our abstractions at our own hands, and at our own expense. (shrink)

Advocates of extended cognition argue that the boundaries of cognition span brain, body, and environment. Critics maintain that cognitive processes are confined to a boundary centered on the individual. All participants to this debate require a criterion for distinguishing what is internal to cognition from what is external. Yet none of the available proposals are completely successful. I offer a new account, the mutual manipulability account, according to which cognitive boundaries are determined by relationships of mutual manipulability between the properties (...) and activities of putative components and the overall behavior of the cognitive mechanism in which they figure. Among its main advantages, this criterion is capable of (a) distinguishing components of cognition from causal background conditions and lower-level correlates, and (b) showing how the core hypothesis of extended cognition can serve as a legitimate empirical hypothesis amenable to experimental test and confirmation. Conceiving the debate in these terms transforms the current clash over extended cognition into a substantive empirical debate resolvable on the basis of evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. (shrink)

How did the events of the early modern period affect the way gender and the self were represented? This collection of essays attempts to respond to this question by analysing a wide spectrum of cultural concerns - humanism, technology, science, law, anatomy, literacy, domesticity, colonialism, erotic practices, and the theatre - in order to delineate the history of subjectivity and its relationship with the postmodern fragmented subject. The scope of this analysis expands the terrain explored by feminist theory, while its (...) feminist focus reveals that the subject is always gendered - although the terms in which gender is conceived and represented change across history. Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture not only explores the representation of gendered subjects, but in its commitment to balancing the productive tensions of methodological diversity, also speaks to contemporary challenges facing feminism. (shrink)

The concepts of adaptive/fitness landscapes and adaptive peaks are a central part of much of contemporary evolutionary biology; the concepts are introduced in introductory texts, developed in more detail in graduate-level treatments, and are used extensively in papers published in the major journals in the field. The appeal of visualizing the process of evolution in terms of the movement of populations on such landscapes is very strong; as one becomes familiar with the metaphor, one often develops the feeling that it (...) is possible to gain deep insights into evolution by thinking about the movement of populations on landscapes consisting of adaptive valleys and peaks. But, since Wright first introduced the metaphor in 1932, the metaphor has been the subject of persistent confusion, from equivocation over just what the features of the landscape are meant to represent to how we ought to expect the landscapes to look. Recent advances—conceptual, empirical, and computational—have pointed towards the inadequacy and indeed incoherence of the landscapes as usually pictured. I argue that attempts to reform the metaphor are misguided; it is time to give up the pictorial metaphor of the landscape entirely and rely instead on the results of formal modeling, however difficult such results are to understand in ‘intuitive’ terms. (shrink)

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the normativity of meaning was thought to be more-or-less 'incontestable.' But in the last 25 years, many philosophers of mind and language have contested it in several seemingly different ways. This, however, is somewhat illusory. There is an unappreciated commonality among most anti-normativist arguments, and this commonality, I argue, poses a problem for anti-normativism. The result, however, is not a wholesale rejection of anti-normativism. Rather, an insight from the anti-normativist position can be harnessed to (...) reveal an unappreciated position in the normativity of meaning debate. (shrink)

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires audit committees of public companies’ boards of directors to install an anonymous reporting channel to assist in deterring and detecting accounting fraud and control weaknesses. While it is generally accepted that the availability of such a reporting channel may reduce the reporting cost of the observer of a questionable act, there is concern that the addition of such a channel may decrease the overall effectiveness compared to a system employing only non-anonymous reporting options. The (...) rationale underlying this concern involves the would-be reporter’s likelihood of reporting, the seriousness with which the organization treats an anonymous report, and the organization’s ability to thoroughly follow-up the report. Thus, we explore the extent to which the availability of an anonymous reporting channel influences intended use of non-anonymous reporting channels. Further, in response to Sarbanes–Oxley and the environment of financial scandals that led to its passage, many firms are strengthening their internal audit departments, and providing them with greater independence from upper management’s direct control. Accordingly, our examination tests whether the intended use of the internal audit department as an internal reporting channel is greater when the internal audit department is of “high” versus “low” quality. Finally, the study investigates intended reporting behavior across three different cases (e.g., settings). Results show that the existence of an anonymous channel does reduce the likelihood of reporting to non-anonymous channels, that generally the internal audit department quality does not affect reporting to non-anonymous channels, and that case-setting affects the type of channel to be used. Implications from the study are discussed. (shrink)

Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to (...) Modest Probabilism meant to offer proof that Modest Probabilism is no better than its orthodox predecessor at avoiding unwarranted precision. (shrink)

Part 1 sets out the logical/semantical background to ‘On Denoting’, including an exposition of Russell's views in Principles of Mathematics, the role and justification of Frege's notorious Axiom V, and speculation about how the search for a solution to the Contradiction might have motivated a new treatment of denoting. Part 2 consists primarily of an extended analysis of Russell's views on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, in which I try to show that the discomfiture between Russell's semantical and (...) epistemological commitments begins as far back as 1903. I close with a non-Russellian critique of Russell's views on how we are able to make use of linguistic representations in thought and with the suggestion that a theory of comprehension is needed to supplement semantic theory. (shrink)

Many of the most important social institutions—e.g., law and language—are thought to be normative in some sense. And philosophers have been puzzled by how this normativity can be explained in terms of the social, descriptive states of affairs that presumably constitute them. This paper attempts to solve this sort of puzzle by considering a simpler and less contentious normative social practice: table manners. Once we are clear on the exact sense in which a practice is normative, we see that some (...) practices can be normative in an interesting and non-trivial sense, but also explicable with merely descriptive resources. In addition to arguing that it is possible to explain normative practices with descriptive resources, this paper presents and defends just such an explanation—an account of the nature of table manners that appeals only to descriptive states of affairs. (shrink)

J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate under (...) ordinary circumstances to deny that someone knows that P, another thing for it to be true that she knows that P. Thus, to the philosophical enterprise of determining which knowledge attributions are true, Austin’s form of criticism is beside the point. I argue that, attractive though it may be, this response to Austin badly underestimates the force of his sort of criticism. (shrink)

Some authors defending the “hereditarian” hypothesis with respect to differences in average IQ scores between populations have argued that the sorts of environmental variation hypothesized by some researchers rejecting the hereditarian position should leave discoverable statistical traces, namely changes in the overall variance of scores or in variance–covariance matrices relating scores to other variables. In this paper, I argue that the claims regarding the discoverability of such statistical signals are broadly mistaken—there is no good reason to suspect that the hypothesized (...) environmental causes would leave detectable traces of the sorts suggested. As there remains no way to gather evidence that would permit the direct refutation of the environmental hypotheses, and no direct evidence for the hereditarian position, it remains the case, I argue, that the hereditarian position is unsupported by current evidence. (shrink)

The Hanafi Sect was the first among the fiqh sects that completed its formation and codification. Abu Hanifa, the founding imam of the sect, raised many students. His most prominent students were Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar. While teaching his students, Abu Hanifa created a free environment and was pleased that his students adopted opposing views to his. Accordingly, different views emerged among the imams in question for reasons such as interpreting the texts, taking into account the changes in (...) customs and time, and approaching the issues from different perspectives. After the death of Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf served as a kadi, i.e. a judge. Muhammad al-Shaybani played an important role in the formation of the sect. Zakat is one of the subjects where different opinions and disagreements occurred among the imams of the madhhab, or sect. Hanafi books exhibited different approaches in revealing these differences of opinion. For example, there were jurists who mentioned and discussed their differences of opinion in detail, as in Ka-sana’s work Bedai al-sanai fi tertib al-sharai, as well as in Mawsili’s work el-Ihtiyar li-talil al-Muhtar. There were also jurists who took a middle way on the subject. In this study, the differences of opinion of the sect imams Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, Muhammed al-Shaybani and Zufar on zakat will be explained based on the book al-Hidaye by Burhaneddin al-Merginani, which is one of the most popular books of the Hanafi sect. However, the commentaries of al-Hidaye and the books of the sect on fiqh will also be consulted occasionally. In this study, the subjects that are considered more important than the others in regard to the fiqh of zakat will be analyzed. (shrink)

Emotional memories are vivid and lasting but not necessarily accurate. Under some conditions, emotion even increases people’s susceptibility to false memories. This review addresses when and why emotion leaves people vulnerable to misremembering events. Recent research suggests that pregoal emotions—those experienced before goal attainment or failure (e.g., hope, fear)—narrow the scope of people’s attention to information that is central to their goals. This narrow focus can impair memory for peripheral details, leaving people vulnerable to misinformation concerning those details. In contrast, (...) postgoal emotions—those experienced after goal attainment or failure (e.g., happiness, sadness)—broaden the scope of attention leaving people more resistant to misinformation. Implications for legal contexts, such as emotion-related errors in eyewitness testimony, are discussed. (shrink)

Abstract:Anticipating sixteenth-century trends in vernacular Aristotelianism, Machiavelli concealed his theoretical engagement with Aristotle behind a veil of examples. Scholars have established that in The Prince, Machiavelli employed topical dialectic to update ancient maxims for the modern era. I show how he used dialectic to occupy and transform Aristotelian commonplaces that justified Renaissance philosophers’ appeal to the ideal in political reasoning. These occupations reveal Machiavelli’s preference for particulars over generalities as a considered judgment about the suitability of philosophy for popular readers. (...) Machiavelli’s covert reading of Aristotle is, I submit, a signal episode in the history of humanism. (shrink)

Crucial to bayesian contributions to the philosophy of science has been a characteristic psychology, according to which investigators harbor degree of confidence assignments that (insofar as the agents are rational) obey the axioms of the probability calculus. The rub is that, if the evidence of introspection is to be trusted, this fruitful psychology is false: actual investigators harbor no such assignments. The orthodox bayesian response has been to argue that the evidence of introspection is not to be trusted here; it (...) is to investigators' dispositions--not to their felt convictions--that the psychology is meant to be (and succeeds in being) faithful. I argue that this response, in both its orthodox and convex-set bayesian forms, should be rejected--as should the regulative ideals that make the response seem so attractive. I offer a different variant of bayesianism, designed to give the evidence of introspection its due and thus realize (as I claim the other forms of bayesianism cannot) the prescriptive mission of the bayesian project. (shrink)

I. G. McFetridge; VII*—Propositions and Davidson's Account of Indirect Discourse, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Page.

Expressivism in logic is the view that logical vocabulary plays a primarily expressive role: that is, that logical vocabulary makes perspicuous in the object language structural features of inference and incompatibility (Brandom, 1994, 2008). I present a precise, technical criterion of expressivity for a logic (§2). I next present a logic that meets that criterion (§3). I further explore some interesting features of that logic: first, a representation theorem for capturing other logics (§3.1), and next some novel logical vocabulary for (...) expressing structural features of inference (§4). (shrink)

In this article, I argue that a mistaken economy–culture dualism underlies the pitting of identity politics against class. I propose we be ‘non-dualists’ instead, viewing economic distributions and cultural representations as importantly co-constitutive, since this non-dualism lets us best theorise the intersections of injustices like class and race. I argue that the most sophisticated dualist attempt to transcend class versus identity debates – Nancy Fraser’s ‘perspectival dualism’ – inadvertently instantiates ‘methodological whiteness’ and struggles to illuminate the intersections of race and (...) class, overlooking how culturally specific representations and understandings importantly constitute economic structures and distributions. Jodi Dean’s contemporary restaging of the class versus identity debate, I suggest, repeats some of Fraser’s dualist missteps. To end, I propose a non-dualist approach which understands the economy as an ideological objectification of certain practices – an objectification which naturalises relations of raced, classed and gendered domination. Building on social reproduction currents of thought, I suggest a counter-hegemonic understanding of the economy – one informed by anti-racist, feminist and socialist rethinkings of what constitutes labour and who constitutes the ‘public’ of the economy’s imaginaries of public value. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the ethics of nonviolent protest when a violent response is either foreseen or intended. One central concern is whether protesters, who foresee a violent response but persist, are provoking the violence and whether they are culpable for any eventual harms. A second concern is whether it is permissible to publicize the violent response for political advantage. I begin by distinguishing between two senses of the term provoke: a normative sense where a provocateur knowingly imposes an (...) unjustified risk of a violent response, and a descriptive sense where the respondent feels provoked. I argue that, when the risk of a violent response is justified, the protesters are not provocateurs but akin to nonculpable, entrapping agents who create an opportunity for the regime to respond with disproportionate violence. The regime’s response can disclose its brutality or criminality and this can be fairly publicized for political advantage. When nonviolent protesters create an unjustified risk of violence either because the injustice they oppose is insufficient to justify the risk of a violent response or because the risked harms are disproportionate with the likely political advantages derived from the protest, they are partially culpable provocateurs. However, I argue these partially culpable provocateurs can still permissibly publicize the disproportionate violence of the regime so as to shape public opinion. (shrink)

This article examines how facial recognition technology reshapes the philosophical debate over the ethics of video surveillance. When video surveillance is augmented with facial recognition, the data collected is no longer anonymous, and the data can be aggregated to produce detailed psychological profiles. I argue that – as this non-anonymous data of people’s mundane activities is collected – unjust risks of harm are imposed upon individuals. In addition, this technology can be used to catalogue all who publicly participate in political, (...) religious, and socially stigmatised activities, and I argue that this would undermine central interests of liberal democracies. I examine the degree to which the interests of individuals and the societal interests of liberal democracies to maintain people’s obscurity while in public coincide with privacy interests, as popularly understood, and conclude that there is a practical need to articulate a novel right to obscurity to protect the interests of liberal democratic societies. (shrink)

I suggest that philosophical writers should connect epistemological theorizing with life experience in order to explore the complex relationship between the two. The relationship of theory to experience does not fit the neat hierarchical model of a small number of general organizing principles giving form to or receiving form from a large mass of facts. Instead, as the narrative of my honeymoon and my life following it suggests, philosophical theories are one of the many genres of stories philosophers tell themselves (...) in the process of creating and recreating personal identities and personae. (shrink)

The normativity of meaning—introduced by Kripke in 1982, and the subject of active debate since the early 1990s—has been exclusively understood in terms of duty-imposing norms. But there are norms of another type, well-known within the philosophy of law: authority-conferring norms. Philosophers thinking and writing about the normativity of meaning—normativists, anti-normativists, and even Kripke himself—seem to have failed to consider the possibility that semantic norms are authority-conferring. I argue that semantic norms should be understood as having an authority-conferring structure, and (...) show how this allows normativism about meaning to escape the two most popular arguments against it. (shrink)

Stroud has argued for many years that skepticism is conditionally correct. We cannot, he claims, both undergo a Cartesian-style examination of the extent of our knowledge as well as avoid skepticism. One reason Stroud's position appears quite plausible is the so-called "totality condition" imposed for this kind of examination: as inquiring philosophers we are called upon to assess all of our knowledge, all at once. However, in this paper I argue that Stroud's apparent understanding of the totality condition is mistaken. (...) Evidently, Stroud thinks that honoring the totality condition amounts to imposing the strong requirement that we initially assume that we don't know anything about external reality. However, there is a weaker requirement available: that we initially not assume that we know anything about external reality. I argue i) that the weaker conception of the totality condition is most suitable for the kind of philosophical examination that Stroud seems to have in mind; and ii) that according to this same conception skepticism is not conditionally correct. (shrink)

The problem of philosophical skepticism relates to the difficulty involved in underwriting the claim that we know anything of spatio-temporal reality. It is often claimed, in fact, that proper philosophical scrutiny reveals quite the opposite from what common sense suggests. Knowledge of external reality is thought to be even quite obviously denied to us as a result of the alleged fact that we all fail to know that certain skeptical scenarios do not obtain. A skeptical scenario is one in which (...) we have neurological occurrences just like any normal situation in which we actually perceive spatio-temporal objects, but where we are deceived in some sense as a result of the manipulation of our brains from some outside source. In this work I attempt to address the problem of philosophical skepticism by claiming that most of us are able to come to know plenty about external reality, since we can come to realize that a certain philosophical theory of perception is correct. The theory I have in mind is what I call a non-cognitive theory of perception. According to this view, perceptual experience is defined by continuous, sensitive behavioral interaction with spatio-temporal objects of the appropriate size, shape, hardness, speed, etc. Knowing that this theory of perception is correct is equivalent to knowing that we know plenty about external reality. This is ultimately because by knowing that a non-cognitive theory of perception is true, we know that any skeptical scenario must fail to obtain. The structure of the work proceeds by first discussing the significance of the problem of philosophical skepticism in some detail. Chapter 1 lays out how the problem does indeed forcefully arise if it is conceded that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. Chapter 2 develops the sort of view of our epistemological situation that falls out of accepting without qualification that the problem exists. Chapter 3 examines and criticizes certain popular responses to the skeptical problem. The main goal of these first three preliminary chapters is to indicate that once it is admitted that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain, the problem of philosophical skepticism forcefully presents itself. Chapter 4, however, attacks the idea that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain. In this chapter I argue that this idea is wedded to the position that a certain theory of perception is correct. The theory in question is what I call a conjunctive theory of veridical experience. According to this view, normal experience of spatio-temporal objects occurs when a subject has a certain perceptual experience, and that experience also happens to match up with and/or be satisfied by what is really the case. Only when a theory of this sort is assumed, I argue, is the claim that we fail to know that the skeptical scenarios fail to obtain found to be obvious. In chapter 5 I argue that, in fact, a non-cognitive theory, rather than a conjunctive theory, is the correct view to maintain. In the final chapter 6 I develop the epistemological position that falls out of accepting a non-cognitive theory. (shrink)

I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. (...) I then argue that this view, which is a version of enactivism, best explains the temporality of conscious experience—what is often called the specious present. (shrink)

I. G. McFetridge; VII*—Propositions and Davidson's Account of Indirect Discourse, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Page.

For a centerless group G, we can define its automorphism tower. We define G α : G 0 = G, G α+1 = Aut(G α ) and for limit ordinals ${G^{\delta}=\bigcup_{\alpha<\delta}G^{\alpha}}$ . Let τ G be the ordinal when the sequence stabilizes. Thomas’ celebrated theorem says ${\tau_{G}<(2^{|G|})^{+}}$ and more. If we consider Thomas’ proof too set theoretical (using Fodor’s lemma), we have here a more direct proof with little set theory. However, set theoretically we get a parallel theorem without the (...) Axiom of Choice. Moreover, we give a descriptive set theoretic approach for calculating an upper bound for τ G for all countable groups G (better than the one an analysis of Thomas’ proof gives). We attach to every element in G α , the αth member of the automorphism tower of G, a unique quantifier free type over G (which is a set of words from ${G*\langle x\rangle}$ ). This situation is generalized by defining “(G, A) is a special pair”. (shrink)

Previous accounting ethics research berates auditors for ethical lapses that contribute to the failure of Andersen (e.g., Duska, R.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 17–29; Staubus, G.: 2005, Journal of Business Ethics 57, 5–15; however, some of the blame must also fall on regulatory and professional bodies that exist to mitigate auditors’ ethical lapses. In this paper, we consider the ethical and economic context that existed and facilitated Andersen’s failure. Our analysis is grounded in Akerlof’s (1970, Quarterly Journal of (...) Economics August, 488–500) Theory of the Market for Lemons and we characterize the market for audit reports as a market for lemons. Consistent with Akerlof’s model, we consider the appropriateness of the countervailing mechanisms that existed at the time of Andersen’s demise that appeared to have effectively failed in counteracting Andersen’s ethical shortcomings. Finally, we assess the appropriateness of the remedies proposed by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA) to ensure that similar ethical lapses will not occur in the future. Our analysis indicates that the SOA regulatory reforms should counteract some of the necessary conditions of the Lemons Model, and thereby mitigate the likelihood of audit failures. However, we contend that the effectiveness of the SOA critically depends upon the focus and attention of the␣Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) towards assessing the ethical climates of public accounting firms. Assessments by the PCAOB of public accounting firm’s ethical climate are needed to sufficiently ensure that public accounting firms effectively promote and maintain audit quality in situations where unconscious bias or economic incentives may erode the public accounting firm’s independence. (shrink)

In Understanding Evolution, Kostas Kampourakis has two related goals. The first is to demonstrate that there are conceptual hurdles to properly understanding evolutionary theory. Kampourakis argues that educators, and other promoters of evolutionary theory, have underestimated how difficult it is to understand evolutionary theory and have tended to treat some gaps in understanding that are in fact the result of conceptual difficulties as if they were instead the result of, e.g., religious intolerance to the theory. This, he thinks, is a (...) mistake. Once we accept that there are aspects of evolutionary theory that are counterintuitive, and that a host of cognitive biases make accepting evolutionary biology difficult, we will be, he argues, in a better position to present compelling argument that can work against these biases. That is the second goal of the book—to present an explanation of contemporary evolutionary theory that is attentive to the ways in which the theory might seem problem .. (shrink)

R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.